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NET NEUTRALITY AND NONDISCRIMINATION 
NORMS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
Daniel A. Lyons* 
“Net neutrality” refers to the principle that broadband providers should treat all 
Internet content and applications equally. After much debate, the Federal 
Communications Commission adopted binding net neutrality rules in December 
2010, which forbid broadband providers from unreasonably discriminating when 
delivering Internet traffic. 
The prohibition on unreasonable discrimination has a long pedigree in 
telecommunications law, and net neutrality proponents have long asserted the 
need to extend that nondiscrimination norm to cyberspace. But the Commission’s 
net neutrality rules impose far greater obligations on broadband providers than 
the law ever imposed on other telecommunications companies. While the 
Commission laudably seeks to protect consumers, its rules have the unintended 
consequence of stifling innovation in the broadband industry. A more nuanced set 
of restrictions grounded in the Commission’s traditional nondiscrimination rules 
would be far superior policy, and would reflect the learned wisdom of 75 years of 
telecommunications law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In late 2010, the Federal Communications Commission adopted a 
revolutionary and controversial set of regulations designed to “preserve the 
Internet as an open platform for innovation, investment, job creation, economic 
growth, competition, and free expression.”1 These rules are commonly known as 
“net neutrality.” Together, the net neutrality rules prescribe the conditions under 
which broadband providers, such as Verizon and Comcast, must make their 
networks available to Internet content and application providers, such as YouTube 
and Facebook. The cornerstone of this new regime is a nondiscrimination rule: 
With few exceptions, broadband providers may not block lawful Internet content 
or applications, nor may they unreasonably discriminate when carrying content or 
applications over their networks.2 
The prohibition on unreasonable discrimination has a long pedigree in 
telecommunications law. Section 202 of the Communications Act prohibits 
common carriers from making “any unjust or unreasonable discrimination in 
charges, practices, classifications, regulations, facilities, or services for or in 
connection with like communication service.”3 For more than 70 years, the 
Commission has regulated telephone companies under § 202 and has developed a 
                                                                                                                
    1. See In re Preserving the Open Internet: Broadband Industry Practices, 25 
FCC Rcd. 17,905, 17,906 (2010) [hereinafter Net Neutrality Rules]. 
    2. Id. at 17,941–51. 
    3. 47 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2012). 
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rich body of law defining what constitutes “unreasonable discrimination” in the 
telecommunications context.4 
Net neutrality proponents have long asserted the need to extend that 
traditional nondiscrimination norm to cyberspace.5 Technically, § 202 does not 
apply to broadband Internet access service. The statute governs only providers of 
“telecommunications service,” a category which includes telephone companies and 
other older communications networks but not broadband providers.6 Yet the 
Internet is rapidly becoming the nation’s dominant communications network and 
bears many similarities to the older networks that § 202 does regulate.7 Just as a 
nondiscrimination norm was appropriate to regulate the telephone providers of the 
twentieth century, proponents argue, the same duties are necessary to govern 
Internet providers of the twenty-first century.8 
But in some ways, the Commission’s net neutrality rules impose greater 
obligations on broadband providers than the law ever imposed on telephone 
companies. In telecommunications and other industries regulated as common 
carriers, the prohibition on “unreasonable discrimination” prevents a company 
from charging different rates to different customers for the same service.9 
Common carriage law generally does not prevent regulated companies from 
charging different rates for different services. For example, the U.S. Postal Service, 
which is perhaps the quintessential common carrier, must make first-class mail 
available for all potential customers, but it may also charge an additional premium 
for customers willing to pay more for Priority or Express Mail. This “tiered-
service model” serves a valuable function: It identifies those parcels that must be 
delivered faster than the typical letter, which allows the post office to engage in 
intelligent traffic management and to provide efficient service to differently 
situated customers. 
                                                                                                                
    4. See, e.g., MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 917 F.2d 30 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 
(summarizing law). 
    5. See, e.g., Tim Wu, Why Have a Telecommunications Law? Anti-
Discrimination Norms in Communications, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 15 (2006) 
(arguing for the need to adopt a broadband nondiscrimination obligation as the key legal 
question for telecommunications regulators); see generally Susan Crawford, Transporting 
Communications, 89 B.U. LAW REV. 871 (2009) (analogizing broadband transport to 
traditional common carriage). 
    6. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 
967, 967–68 (2005). As discussed below, the FCC has classified broadband as an 
“information service,” which is governed by Title I of the Act and is exempt from the more 
stringent Title II common carriage requirements. But Brand X suggests that the agency 
could reclassify broadband service as “telecommunications service” if it chose to do so. 
    7. See Wu, supra note 5, at 16 (“This paper argues that in the future the main 
point of the telecommunications law should be as an anti-discrimination regime, and that 
the main challenge for regulators will be getting the anti-discrimination rules right. The 
view advanced here, while much popularized over the last decade, has deeper roots reaching 
back to the origins of telecommunications and common carriage itself.”). 
    8. See id. 
    9. See, e.g., MCI Telecomm. Corp., 917 F.2d at 39. 
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Yet the net neutrality rules prevent broadband providers from using this 
type of intelligent traffic management to route messages over their networks. For 
example, broadband providers may not enter into agreements that allow specific 
content providers (such as Netflix) to pay a premium for priority delivery on a 
network.10 Moreover, broadband providers cannot block a particular content or 
application provider from their networks, even if the reason is the content 
provider’s refusal to pay a fee to use the network.11 In cyberspace, not only are all 
content and application providers limited to “first-class mail” only, but the “post 
office” must deliver it free of charge.12 
The expansive reach of the Commission’s net neutrality rule is 
particularly surprising given the fact that most broadband markets do not exhibit 
the characteristics that have historically triggered nondiscrimination requirements. 
Over the past century, regulators have often justified common carriage obligations 
as a tool to control potential excesses by firms with market power. For example, 
Congress enacted § 202 to assure that the Bell telephone company did not abuse its 
monopoly position over most of the nation’s telephone service.13 By comparison, 
the Commission has repeatedly noted that the broadband market is competitive, 
with 82% of Americans having a choice of at least two providers for broadband 
service.14 And that competitiveness will increase if wireless broadband service 
develops as a viable third alternative, the same way that satellite developed as a 
wireless alternative to cable.15 Meanwhile, the Commission has noted only a 
handful of instances in which broadband providers have exploited what market 
                                                                                                                
  10. Net Neutrality Rules, supra note 1, at 17,947 (“[A] commercial arrangement 
between a broadband provider and a third party to directly or indirectly favor some traffic 
over other traffic in the broadband Internet access service connection to a subscriber of the 
broadband provider (i.e., ‘pay for priority’) would raise significant cause for concern . . . . 
[A]s a general matter, it is unlikely that pay for priority would satisfy the ‘no unreasonable 
discrimination’ standard.”). 
  11. Id. at 17,943–44 (“Some concerns have been expressed that broadband 
providers may seek to charge edge providers simply for delivering traffic to or carrying 
traffic from the broadband provider’s end-user customers. To the extent that a content, 
application, or service provider could avoid being blocked only by paying a fee, charging 
such a fee would not be permissible under these rules.”). 
  12. Of course, this comparison is imperfect: Unlike the postal service, broadband 
providers charge end-user consumers to be on the network. 
  13. Cf. Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1145 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Thus, in contrast 
to 1934, when Congress enacted §§ 201(b) and 202(a) to protect customers for whom 
AT&T was the only option, the FCC now defers to the market unless the market is seriously 
flawed or not competitive.”). 
  14. FCC, NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN 37 (2010), available at http://download.
broadband.gov/plan/national-broadband-plan-chapter-4-broadband-competition-and-
innovation-policy.pdf. 
  15. Cf. id. at 76, available at http://download.broadband.gov/plan/national-
broadband-plan-chapter-5-spectrum.pdf. 
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power they do have to hurt consumers.16 For this reason, opponents have long 
described net neutrality as a “solution in search of a problem.”17 
When examined through the lens of history and the policy underlying that 
history, one realizes that the Commission’s net neutrality rules reach too far. Given 
the similarities between broadband networks and other telecommunications 
networks, some form of nondiscrimination duty is probably appropriate. But the 
history of § 202 suggests that the rule should be far more modest than the 
Commission’s current framework. The current rule ignores the fact that content 
and application providers have different bandwidth demands and that network 
capacity is a limited resource that must be allocated to fit those providers’ needs 
efficiently. It thus disregards the benefits of flexible, intelligent traffic 
management by broadband providers. It also unnecessarily limits innovation in the 
broadband provider market and downplays the importance of antitrust law as a 
mechanism to discipline anticompetitive conduct. A more nuanced, modest set of 
restrictions based on § 202 would be far superior policy and would reflect the 
learned wisdom of nearly 75 years of common carriage law as applied to 
telecommunications. 
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE OPEN INTERNET RULES 
A. Defining Net Neutrality 
Before putting the Commission’s nondiscrimination obligation into 
historical context, it is helpful to define net neutrality, examine the history of the 
present rules, and explain what specific duties those rules impose upon broadband 
service providers. Net neutrality is a somewhat elusive term, one that holds 
different meanings for different speakers. A useful place to start is with 
Commission Chairman Julius Genachowski’s preferred metaphor. The 
Commission’s new rules, he explained, are designed to regulate the “on-ramps to 
the Internet,”18 the privately held telecommunications networks that connect 
                                                                                                                
  16. See Net Neutrality Rules, supra note 1, at 17,925, nn.104–05 (citing Madison 
River Commc’ns, LLC and affiliated companies, File No. EB-05-IH-0110; Acct. No.; FRN: 
0004334082, Consent Decree, 20 FCC Rcd. 4295 (EB 2005); In re Formal Complaint of 
Free Press and Pub. Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer 
Applications, 23 FCC Rcd. 13,028, 13,028, 13,055–56 (2008)). 
17. See, e.g., Babette E.L. Boliek, Wireless Net Neutrality and the Problem with 
Pricing: An Empirical, Cautionary Tale, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 22 
(2009) (“[C]ritics of network neutrality regulation have often said that it is a solution in 
search of a problem.”) (citing Amy Schatz, U.S. as Traffic Cop in Web Fight, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 19, 2009, at A1); see also Preserving the Open Internet: Broadband Industry Practices, 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 24 FCC Rcd. 13,064, 13,088 (2009) (“Other parties have 
suggested that ‘the problems are all potential problems, not actual problems’ and that the 
‘fundamental inability to demonstrate any evidence of an actual market failure confirms 
what all the rhetoric in the world cannot obscure: “net neutrality” is a solution in search of a 
problem.’” (citing comments)). 
  18. Julius Genachowski, Conversations with FCC Chairman Julius 
Genachowski: Thoughts on the October Commission Meeting & the Open Internet NPRM 
(Oct. 22, 2009), available at http://www.openinternet.gov/openmeetings/2009_10_22-
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individual consumers to the Internet’s servers. When a consumer requests content 
from the Internet (such as a webpage or video clip), the host server breaks the 
content into several small digital packets. Each packet travels over a series of 
networks to the consumer.19 In the final leg of that journey, these packets travel 
over the wires owned by the consumer’s broadband provider to get to the 
consumer’s computer, where they are reassembled into the requested message. 
Net neutrality proponents have long been concerned by the fact that 
broadband providers control this vital chokepoint between individual consumers 
and the Internet. By regulating the terms upon which content providers use their 
networks to reach consumers, broadband providers could manipulate the flow of 
information in society. For example, Comcast could conceivably block consumer 
access to websites like www.comcastsucks.org that criticize the company.20 
Perhaps more realistically, Comcast could block or degrade content and 
applications like Netflix that compete against its other revenue-generating 
services.21 Unlike America Online and other first-generation dial-up Internet 
access providers, most broadband providers do not specialize in providing Internet 
access alone. Rather, the largest broadband providers are cable and telephone 
companies, which have incentives to prevent customers from using their 
broadband connections in ways that threaten their other revenue streams. For 
example, consumer groups have expressed concerns that broadband Internet 
providers that also offer on-demand movie rentals via cable might discriminate 
against other services (such as Netflix or BitTorrent) that make movies available 
over a broadband connection.22 Similarly, the Commission has suggested that 
AT&T initially blocked Voice-over-Internet-Protocol (“VoIP”) applications, such 
as Skype, from operating on the iPhone over the AT&T network because these 
applications competed against the provider’s wireless telephone business.23 
Even benign content discrimination can distort the ongoing development 
of the Internet ecosystem. As Professors Larry Lessig and Tim Wu have explained, 
a broadband provider’s ability to block or degrade certain content runs afoul of the 
                                                                                                                
ocm.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2012); see also Prof. Gigi B. Sohn, President and Founder of 
Public Knowledge, Remarks at 2009 National Lawyers Convention Panel, hosted by 
Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy, in Broadband Policy: One Year in, 7 SETON 
HALL CIR. REV. 27, 40 (2009) (“First of all, net neutrality is not about regulating the 
Internet. I think that’s really important. It’s not about regulating the content, services, and 
applications that make up the Internet; it’s about regulating the on-ramps, the ISPs that 
provide the on-ramps to the Internet, to ensure that they don’t pick winners and losers.”). 
  19. See Intel Corp., The Internet Lesson 4: Breaking Messages into Packets, 
JOURNEY INSIDE, http://www97.intel.com/en/TheJourneyInside/ExploreTheCurriculum/
EC_TheInternet/ILesson4/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2011). 
  20. Cf. Morrison & Foerster, LLP v. Wick, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1134 (D. Colo. 
2000) (allowing partnership holding registered trademark to block website using trademark 
to criticize partnership practices). 
  21. See Net Neutrality Rules, supra note 1, at 17,916. 
  22. See In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Pub. Knowledge Against 
Comcast Corp. for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC Rcd. 13,028, 
13,029–33 (2008). 
  23. Net Neutrality Rules, supra note 1, at 17,925 & nn.106–07. 
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end-to-end principle upon which the Internet was built.24 The Internet is comprised 
of a series of “best efforts” networks, each of which helps deliver any and all 
digital packets based upon the network’s best guess as to how to forward each 
packet to its final destination.25 A critical element of this network architecture is 
that best efforts networks are indifferent as to the content of each packet. This 
functionality greatly reduces the cost of cyberspace innovation: As long as a 
service can be converted to digital packets, the network will facilitate its delivery 
to the consumer just like any other service in cyberspace.26 A developer needs only 
to write a program and place it on a public server, and the program is then 
immediately available to millions of Internet users worldwide. As Robert Atkinson 
and Philip Weiser note, 
This architecture enabled companies like Google and eBay to come 
out of nowhere—a garage, if you will—to contribute greatly to the 
Internet economy. Indeed, most (if not all) of the significant Internet 
innovations were developed or deployed by individuals and firms 
with no connection to the established providers—ranging from e-
commerce (Amazon.com and eBay), to search (Google), to VoIP 
(Vonage and Skype), to a host of other applications.27 
If broadband providers departed from the best efforts principle and 
instead prioritized certain packets over others on the basis of content, they could 
distort the market for Internet content and applications. As Professors Lessig and 
Wu explain, prioritization “threaten[s] to replace survival-of-the-fittest with 
survival-of-the-favored.”28 Rather than allowing competition to shape the market 
for Internet content, broadband providers could pick and choose winners by 
prioritizing favored competitors. And if broadband providers could charge for 
priority delivery, they would dramatically raise the cost of Internet innovation by 
requiring programmers to pay a toll before their products could reach consumers. 
This could shift power toward well-funded corporate developers and away from 
the garage-programmers whose innovations have made the Internet what it is. 
Opponents of net neutrality offer several responses to these arguments. 
First and foremost, they note that even without a net neutrality rule, there have 
been few significant instances of discriminatory conduct by broadband providers.29 
                                                                                                                
  24. See Lawrence Lessig & Tim Wu, Ex Parte Submission in CS Docket No.  
02-52 at 5–6 (August 22, 2003), available at http://timwu.org/wu_lessig_fcc.pdf. 
  25. See Robert D. Atkinson & Philip J. Weiser, A “Third Way” on Network 
Neutrality, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUNDATION 4, May 30, 2006, available at 
http://www.itif.org/files/netneutrality.pdf. 
  26. Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. 
& HIGH TECH. L. 141, 145–46 (2003). 
  27. Atkinson & Weiser, supra note 25, at 4. 
  28. Lessig & Wu, supra note 24, at 6. 
  29. The FCC cited only three incidents in its net neutrality rules: a 2005 
investigation into Madison River Communications, which was accused of blocking its 
customers from using Voice-Over-Internet-Protocol services that competed against Madison 
River’s own telephone service, which was resolved by consent decree; a 2008 investigation 
into Comcast Corporation’s throttling of BitTorrent traffic over its broadband networks, 
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In part, this is because broadband providers generally have strong incentives not to 
block content or applications on their networks. At their core, these companies do 
not themselves provide most online products that their customers want. Rather, 
broadband providers connect customers to the services available in cyberspace—
and the value of that connection to the customer is directly related to the number of 
sites the customer can reach. “[W]ithout the Googles of the world—who make 
broadband providers more valuable by enhancing their functionality—the AT&Ts 
of the world would have to charge less for broadband Internet access.”30 Every 
website or application that is blocked reduces the value of broadband access to the 
consumer and, therefore, adversely affects the price the consumer will pay for the 
broadband provider’s service. 
And while critics acknowledge that broadband providers may have 
economic incentives to block or degrade certain content or application providers, 
competitive pressure and antitrust law each help to police such misbehavior. If a 
company has market power, antitrust doctrines—such as the law governing 
unilateral refusals to deal—protect consumers just as they do in every other area of 
the economy.31 Therefore, although some government oversight is appropriate, 
critics question whether stringent Commission regulation benefits consumers 
above and beyond the protections they receive from general economic 
regulations.32 
Moreover, these critics argue that the end-to-end architecture that Lessig 
and Wu champion may in fact hamper future Internet-based innovations. As 
Atkinson and Weiser note, “‘best effort’ networks . . . represent[] a questionable 
                                                                                                                
which Comcast discontinued; and a vague reference to AT&T’s efforts to limit the types of 
applications that iPhone customers could use over the AT&T Wireless network, which 
appear to have been resolved to the Commission’s satisfaction. See Net Neutrality Rules, 
supra note 1, 17,925 & nn.104–05 (citing, among others, Madison River Commc’ns, LLC 
and affiliated companies, Consent Decree, 20 FCC Rcd. 4295 (EB 2005); In re Formal 
Complaint of Free Press and Pub. Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for Secretly 
Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC Rcd. 13,028 (2008). See generally Daniel A. 
Lyons, Virtual Takings: The Coming Fifth Amendment Challenge to Net Neutrality 
Regulation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 65, 81–82 (2011) (discussing Madison River and 
Comcast cases). 
  30. Atkinson & Weiser, supra note 25, at 7. 
  31. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 
483 n.32 (1992) (“[A] firm can refuse to deal with its competitors. But such a right is not 
absolute; it exists only if there are legitimate competitive reasons for the refusal.”); Aspen 
Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985) (“If a firm has been 
‘attempting to exclude rivals on some basis other than efficiency,’ it is fair to characterize 
its behavior as predatory.”); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 378 
(1973). See generally Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Antitrust Oversight of an Antitrust Dispute: 
An Institutional Perspective on the Net Neutrality Debate, 7 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. 
L. 19, 57 (2009) (advocating for antitrust-based oversight of broadband competition policy 
and explaining that “net neutrality disputes are, at bottom, disputes about the proper 
application of core antitrust principles”). 
  32. See Babette E.L. Boliek, FCC Regulation vs. Antitrust: How Net Neutrality 
is Defining the Boundaries, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 1627, 1678 (2011). 
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platform for the deployment of applications requiring quality of service 
assurances.”33 This is because the end-to-end architecture provides no guarantee 
that individual packets will arrive at their destinations quickly, or at all. Network 
congestion can be a significant driver of packet delay. If more packets attempt to 
pass through an intermediate router than the router can handle at a particular 
moment, the router will alleviate the congestion by delaying or dropping packets. 
For older applications like e-mail and the World Wide Web, packet delay is an 
insignificant problem. Because the whole message displays once the final packet is 
delivered, the consumer experiences at most a short delay in loading time. But for 
streaming video content and interactive applications, such as video conferencing 
and online gaming, the consumer experience depends on a steady stream of 
packets at regular intervals. Delays in the spacing of packets in a stream can cause 
jitter, which results in a temporary freezing of the video image as the consumer’s 
computer waits for the packet stream to catch up.34 Jitter can substantially erode a 
consumer’s experience and renders an application less valuable or (in some 
circumstances) useless. If broadband providers could offer quality-of-service 
guarantees, which would give protected packets priority in the event of network 
congestion, the quality and quantity of these next-generation applications would 
increase, because application providers could minimize jitter and improve the 
consumer’s experience. 
Finally, broadband providers note that their networks were not developed 
free of cost. They were the result of literally billions of dollars of private 
investment to lay high-speed cables across the country. Broadband providers seek 
to recover those investments in part by charging consumers monthly subscription 
fees for broadband Internet access. But broadband Internet access charges are 
insufficient alone to recoup those investments, particularly if our society is 
concerned with keeping broadband affordable and avoiding a digital divide.35 
Broadband providers also seek to recover their investments by selling premium 
services that high-speed cable makes possible—services like premium telephony, 
cable television, and video on-demand services.36 If the broadband network 
becomes congested in a way that would degrade these services, broadband 
                                                                                                                
  33. Atkinson & Weiser, supra note 25, at 4. 
  34. See Christopher S. Yoo, The Changing Patterns of Internet Usage, 63 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 67, 71–72 (2010). 
  35. See, e.g., Wall Street’s Perspective on Telecommunications: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on Com., Sci. & Transp., 109th Cong. 15 (2006) (testimony of Craig E. 
Moffett, Vice President and Senior Analyst, Sanford C. Bernstein and Co., LLP) 
(“Mandated ‘Net Neutrality’ would further sour Wall Street’s taste for broadband 
infrastructure investments, making it increasingly difficult to sustain the necessary capital 
investments. It would also likely mean that consumers alone would be required to foot the 
bill for whatever future network investments that do get made.”). 
  36. See, e.g., Implementation of Section 621(a)(1) of the Cable Communications 
Policy Act of 1984 As Amended by the Cable Television Consumer Protection and 
Competition Act of 1992, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd. 18,581, 18,590 
(2005) (noting “the relationship between the ability to offer video programming and the 
willingness to invest in broadband facilities”). 
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providers would like the flexibility to prioritize their own services’ packets, since 
they have contractual obligations to their premium service customers.37 
It is also important to recognize the limits of the net neutrality debate. Net 
neutrality focuses on the potential terms and conditions that broadband providers 
can impose upon content and application providers, such as Google. It is not about 
the rates that broadband providers can charge end-user consumers for Internet 
access. Both sides of the debate agree that broadband providers should be 
permitted to charge end-users different rates based on the amount of bandwidth 
they consume each month. Therefore, although Chairman Genachowski often 
refers to net neutrality as regulating the “onramp to the Internet,”38 it is perhaps 
more accurate to describe it as regulating the Internet’s offramp: the flow of 
information from Internet-based content and application providers to consumers. 
B. The Evolution of Net Neutrality Obligations 
The Commission first weighed in on the net neutrality debate with an 
addendum to a 2005 order governing broadband service offered over telephone 
lines.39 Prior to this order, an “open access” regime governed telephone-based 
Internet access: If a telephone company offered Internet access, it had to make its 
wires available to rival Internet service providers, such as America Online, to use 
in competition with the phone company.40 The open access requirement was a 
legacy of the era when AT&T monopolized the telephone industry.41 But as the 
broadband industry developed, the open access restriction inhibited telephone 
companies’ ability to compete against cable-based broadband service, which was 
not saddled with the same limitations.42 To achieve regulatory parity and promote 
                                                                                                                
  37. Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Need for a Technological 
Turn in Internet Scholarship, in HANDBOOK OF MEDIA LAW AND POLICY: A SOCIO-LEGAL 
EXPLORATION (Monroe E. Price & Stefaan G. Verhulst eds., Routledge forthcoming 2012) 
(noting that “U-verse (AT&T’s video service) does not have enough bandwidth to provide 
video in the same manner as cable companies and FiOS. Thus, in order to avoid the delays 
that can render video programming unwatchable, U-verse reserves bandwidth for its own 
proprietary video offerings and gives its video traffic priority over other traffic”), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2063994. 
  38. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
  39. See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over 
Wireline Facilities, Policy Statement, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,986, 14,988 (2005) [hereinafter 
Internet Policy Statement]. 
  40. See Second Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 1980 (“Computer II”), aff’d sub 
nom. Computer & Commc’ns. Indus. Ass’n. v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
  41. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline 
Facilities: Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,853, 
14,686 (2005) [hereinafter Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access]. 
  42. See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and 
Other Facilities: Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling, Appropriate Regulatory Treatment 
for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Cable Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798 (2002). The 
Supreme Court blessed the agency’s decision in Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand 
X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
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facilities-based competition, the Commission reclassified telephone-based 
broadband service and thus lifted the open access restriction.43 
But through a companion policy statement, the Commission signaled that 
this deregulatory move should not be confused with a general abdication of 
authority to regulate broadband. Rather, the Commission explained that it “has a 
duty to preserve and promote the vibrant and open character of the Internet as the 
telecommunications marketplace enters the broadband age.”44 To that end, the 
Commission announced four principles that would guide its Internet policy: 
Consumers are entitled to 
 Access lawful Internet content of their choice; 
 Run applications and use services of their choice; 
 Connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm the 
network; and 
 Competition among network providers, application and service 
providers, and content providers.45 
The principles were contained in a policy statement and therefore did not 
contain any binding obligations,46 a fact that the Commission acknowledged.47 
Nonetheless, the Commission explained that it would “incorporate the above 
principles into its ongoing policymaking activities.”48 The non-binding policy 
statement was seen as a warning shot at the broadband industry, signaling that the 
Commission took seriously net neutrality proponents’ concerns about bottleneck 
discrimination. 
Initially, the Commission sought voluntary industry compliance with its 
new principles. In exchange for Commission approval of its 2005 acquisition of 
AT&T, SBC Communications agreed to “conduct business in a manner that 
comports with the principles set forth in the FCC’s Policy Statement” for two 
years after the merger closing date.49 The company later extended its compliance 
for an additional 30 months in exchange for the Commission’s approval of its 
merger with BellSouth.50 The Commission solicited a similar two-year 
commitment from Verizon Communications as a condition of approving its 2005 
                                                                                                                
  43. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access, supra note 41, at 14,875–77. 
  44. Internet Policy Statement, supra note 39, at 14,988. 
  45. Id. 
  46. See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) 
(“Interpretations such as those in opinion letters-like interpretations contained in policy 
statements . . . lack the force of law . . . .”). 
  47. Internet Policy Statement, supra note 39, at 14,998 n.15 (“Accordingly, we 
are not adopting rules in this policy statement.”). 
  48. Id. at 14,998. 
  49. SBC Commc’ns, Inc. and AT&T Corp. Applications for Approval of 
Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 FCC Rcd. 18,290, 18,392 & app. 
F (2005). 
  50. AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corp. Application for Transfer of Control, 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 22 FCC Rcd. 5662, 5814 app. F (2007). 
1040 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 54:1029 
merger with MCI.51 It also attached openness conditions to a valuable 2008 
spectrum license auction, which required the winner (Verizon Wireless) to permit 
any lawful wireless device to use that spectrum for service.52 
But a high-profile incident led the Commission to reconsider its 
adherence to voluntary compliance. In late 2007, a Commission investigation 
showed that Comcast was surreptitiously “throttling” (slowing delivery of) 
broadband traffic from users of BitTorrent and other peer-to-peer networking 
applications, which allow users to share files with one another.53 Comcast claimed 
throttling was necessary to manage the significant network traffic imposed by 
torrent users.54 But opponents suggested a more anticompetitive motive, alleging 
that torrenting of movies online was cutting into Comcast’s on-demand movie 
rental business.55 In an adjudicatory hearing, the Commission ruled that its Internet 
Policy Statement should be binding on broadband providers and that Comcast had 
violated the statement by interfering with customers’ ability to run applications 
and access content of their choice.56 Shortly thereafter, the Commission 
promulgated a notice of proposed rulemaking that sought to place binding net 
neutrality obligations on broadband providers to preserve an open Internet.57 
But just days before the comment period closed in April 2010, the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the Comcast order on jurisdictional grounds.58 
Unlike its powers over broadcasting, cable, and telecommunications service, the 
Commission lacks explicit jurisdiction to regulate broadband service, which it has 
classified as an “information service.”59 Instead, the Commission anchored the 
Comcast order in its so-called “ancillary authority,” which allows the agency to 
regulate other communications by wire or radio if this regulation is reasonably 
ancillary to the Commission’s direct responsibilities.60 While the court recognized 
                                                                                                                
  51. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. and MCI, Inc. Applications for Approval of 
Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 FCC Rcd. 18,433, 18,537 (2005). 
  52. Service Rules for the 698–746, 747–62 and 777–92 MHz Bands et al., 
Second Report and Order, 22 FCC Rcd. 15,289, 15,361–62 (2007); 47 C.F.R. § 27.16 
(2012). 
  53. In re Comcast, 23 FCC Rcd. 13,028, 13,030–31 (2008). Comcast initially 
disclaimed any wrongdoing but later confessed after independent testing by the Associated 
Press and consumer interest groups confirmed the company’s actions. The Commission was 
troubled not only because Comcast initially misled the public about its actions, but also 
because of the fraudulent nature of the throttling. When the network detected a peer-to-peer 
transmission, Comcast would forge a packet to each party claiming to be from the other user 
and signaling a desire to terminate the transmission. 
  54. Id. at 13,031–32. 
  55. Id. at 13,030. 
  56. Id. at 13,050–51. 
  57. See Preserving the Open Internet, Broadband Industry Practices, Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 24 FCC Rcd. 13,064, 13,067 (2009). See generally Lyons, supra 
note 29, at 83–86 (summarizing the proposed rule). 
  58. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
  59. Id. at 645. 
  60. Id. at 646 (quoting United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 
178 (1968)). 
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that broadband service is indeed communication by wire or radio, it rejected the 
Commission’s arguments that broadband network management rules were 
reasonably ancillary to its duties to regulate broadcasting, cable, or 
telecommunications service.61 
The Comcast decision served as a judicial shot across the bow of the 
Commission’s nascent net neutrality project.62 The proposed net neutrality rules 
relied on (at times almost word-for-word) the jurisdictional arguments that the 
Comcast court rejected, and thus the Commission’s authority to enact the new 
rules was questionable. It appeared for some time that the Commission might 
reclassify broadband service as a Title II telecommunications service, which would 
bring the industry within the Commission’s direct authority.63 This move would 
have been the equivalent of fitting a square peg in a round hole: Congress wrote 
Title II to govern the telephone industry, and many of its provisions would be 
either irrelevant or harmful if applied to broadband. Although the Commission 
could exercise its forbearance authority to mitigate these concerns,64 it ultimately 
chose to avoid reclassification and instead imposed net neutrality obligations on 
the broadband industry using the ancillary authority that the Comcast court had 
called into question. 
C. The Commission’s Net Neutrality Rules 
The final order adopted three basic rules to preserve the free and open 
Internet. The first is a transparency rule. Broadband providers must “publicly 
disclose accurate information regarding the network management practices, 
performance, and commercial terms of [their] broadband Internet access 
services.”65 Such information includes rules regarding pricing, performance 
                                                                                                                
  61. Id. at 659–61. 
  62. See Daniel A. Lyons, Tethering the Administrative State: The Case Against 
Chevron Deference for FCC Jurisdictional Claims, 36 J. CORP. L. 823, 840–45 (2011) 
(discussing the Comcast decision as part of an institutional dialogue among the court, the 
agency, and Congress regarding the proper decisionmaker for Internet policy). 
  63. See Framework for Broadband Internet Serv., Notice of Inquiry, 25 FCC 
Rcd. 7866, 7889–907 (2010) (proposing reclassification of broadband networks under Title 
II). 
  64. Id. at 7895. Chairman Genachowski and Commission General Counsel 
Austin Schlick both endorsed this jurisdictional move, which one might label “Title II-lite” 
regulation. See Julius Genachowski, The Third Way: A Narrowly Tailored Broadband 
Framework, BROADBAND.GOV (May 6, 2010), http://www.broadband.gov/the-third-way-
narrowly-tailored-broadband-framework-chairman-julius-genachowski.html. Specifically, 
the Commission would have reclassified the transport element of broadband service as a 
Title II telecommunications service, but then forbeared from applying any part of Title II to 
broadband transport other than §§ 201, 202, and 208 (relating to nondiscrimination 
obligations placed on telecommunications providers), and §§ 222, 254, and 255 (imposing 
obligations related to privacy, universal service funding, and access requirements for 
hearing-impaired users). Id. Had the Commission taken this route, the question addressed in 
this Article would be more squarely presented, because the Commission would be imposing 
§ 202 directly on broadband providers. 
  65. Net Neutrality Rules, supra note 1, at 17,937. 
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characteristics, privacy policies, security, congestion-management rules, 
application-specific behavior, and device attachment.66 The transparency rules 
assure that customers can make informed choices among broadband providers and 
provide a vehicle through which broadband providers can be held accountable if 
they fail to maintain an open Internet.67 
Second, broadband providers who provide “fixed” broadband service, 
such as traditional telephone and cable providers, may not “block lawful content, 
applications, services, or nonharmful devices.”68 This rule thus aims to preserve 
the basic principles of the Internet Policy Statement, that consumers are entitled to 
their choice of lawful content, services, and devices on the Internet. The 
Commission clarified that the no-blocking rule requires that content and 
application providers must be able to reach a broadband provider’s customers for 
free: “To the extent that a content, application, or service provider could avoid 
being blocked only by paying a fee, charging such a fee would not be permissible 
under these rules.”69 However, because the mobile broadband industry is still 
developing, mobile broadband providers are only prohibited from blocking 
websites and any applications that compete with the provider’s voice or video 
telephony service.70 
Finally, fixed broadband providers “shall not unreasonably discriminate 
in transmitting lawful network traffic over a consumer’s broadband Internet access 
service.”71 This language is reminiscent of the common carriage duties that Title II 
imposes on telecommunications providers and codifies the proposed additional 
rule introduced for the first time in the notice of proposed rulemaking. The 
Commission declined to define unreasonable discrimination, though it offered a 
few guideposts for consideration. Differential treatment of traffic is more likely to 
be reasonable if it is clearly disclosed to customers, if it places the decision-
making largely in the hands of end-users rather than providers, and if it does not 
discriminate among specific uses of the network or classes of uses.72 The 
Commission clarified that charging end-user customers different rates based upon 
their bandwidth use would be reasonable73 but that charging content and 
application providers for priority access “would raise significant cause for 
concern.”74 As with the blocking rule, the prohibition on unreasonable 
discrimination does not bind wireless broadband providers. 
The rules also contain two safe harbors. First, conduct that otherwise may 
violate the rules would be permissible if it constitutes “reasonable network 
                                                                                                                
  66. Id. at 17,938. 
  67. Id. at 17,936–37. 
  68. Id. at 17,942. 
  69. Id. at 17,943–44. 
  70. Id. at 17,950. 
  71. Id. at 17,944. 
  72. Id. at 17,944–45. 
  73. Id. at 17,945. 
  74. Id. at 17,947–48. 
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management.”75 “A network management practice is reasonable if it is appropriate 
and tailored to achieving a legitimate network management purpose, taking into 
account the particular network architecture and technology of the broadband 
Internet access service.”76 Examples of a legitimate purpose include maintaining 
network security, blocking harmful traffic, or enacting the legitimate preferences 
of end-users. Second, broadband providers are permitted to provide so-called 
“specialized services,” such as VoIP or IP-based cable service, which share space 
on the broadband provider’s network,77 though the Commission will monitor such 
services closely to make sure providers do not use this carve-out as a way to 
circumvent the net neutrality rules. 
Thus while the Commission provided a general explanation to broadband 
providers of permissible and impermissible forms of network traffic management, 
it was purposely vague regarding detailed guidelines. The Commission explained 
that in a dynamic environment such as cyberspace, it preferred to develop 
guidance on a case-by-case basis through the adjudicative process, rather than 
provide detailed rules that could ossify policy in a way that would be either over- 
or underinclusive when applied to the developing Internet ecosystem. 
But it is important to note that this is not the agency’s first attempt to 
define a nondiscrimination rule. The net neutrality rules borrow the phrase 
“unreasonable discrimination” from § 202 of the Act, where it has been subject to 
more than 70 years of common-law-like development through the adjudicative 
process. The purpose of both provisions is similar: The Commission seeks to 
prohibit network providers with control over the flow of information from unduly 
affecting that information flow in a way that could harm consumers. Thus, the 
history of § 202 can cast significant light upon the proper role of a 
nondiscrimination norm as applied to cyberspace. And while the Commission 
explicitly stated that it has no intention of imposing burdensome common-
carriage-like duties on broadband providers,78 a more detailed glance at § 202 
suggests that in some ways, the net neutrality rules are more restrictive than § 202 
ever was. It is to this inquiry that this Article now turns. 
II. “UNREASONABLE DISCRIMINATION” IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
A. Economic Discrimination and § 202 
One might begin this inquiry by determining the purpose of 
nondiscrimination law. In his article on the topic, Tim Wu explains that 
nondiscrimination rules are an integral part of a legal system designed “to foster 
the vibrancy and health of [a] part of the nation’s public infrastructure.”79 
Historically, common carriage regimes applied to “businesses affected with the 
public interest,” a notoriously vague definition coined by Lord Matthew Hale in 
                                                                                                                
  75. Id. at 17,951. 
  76. Id. at 17,952. 
  77. Id. at 17,965. 
  78. Id. at 17,950–51. 
  79. Wu, supra note 5, at 26. 
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1787 to describe certain companies that provide essential social services.80 In the 
Anglo-American tradition these businesses included package carriers, taxis, 
railroads, inns, grain elevators, and utilities, among others.81 Underlying these 
legal regimes is a sense that, because of network architecture, historic accident, 
necessity, or market power, these industries should generally be required to treat 
similarly situated customers in a similar fashion. Although as Thomas Nachbar 
notes in his comprehensive study of the subject, “[t]here is no particularly good 
rule for distinguishing industries subjected to nondiscrimination obligations from 
those with complete discretion in their dealings.”82 As Wu discusses, there are 
myriad risks that face a regulator seeking to promote the health of the nation’s 
communications networks. An underregulated network poses the risk that a private 
network owner may make decisions that maximize self-interest but damage the 
overall social value of the network—for example, by using network access to 
distort other markets in which the company also operates.83 Moreover, a firm may 
be unable to capture all the positive externalities that a network creates for society, 
and its attempts to do so may damage the network’s value.84 
But of course, overregulation poses its own dangers. Government’s 
efforts to plan today based on predictions of the future “have a storied history of 
failure.”85 Wu highlights the Commission’s past efforts to promote UHF as a 
competitive alternative to existing broadcast television, and its recent expensive 
digital television transition, neither of which proved successful.86 One could also 
include in this category the Commission’s efforts to promote local telephone 
competition in the late 1990s by compelling incumbent telephone companies to 
make their networks available to competitors, an experiment that is widely viewed 
as a failure.87 
The Communications Act of 1934 strikes this balance between over- and 
underregulation by prohibiting unreasonable discrimination by 
telecommunications providers.88 Congress imported this duty from the Interstate 
Commerce Act, which had applied a similar standard to the nation’s transportation 
and certain other interstate industries for decades.89 The bar on unreasonable 
                                                                                                                
  80. Id. at 30–31; see also Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great 
Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1332–33 (1998); 
Thomas B. Nachbar, The Public Network, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 67, 69, 82, 90 (2008) 
(discussing the history of common carriage generally and Lord Hale specifically). 
  81. Nachbar, supra note 80, at 76–77. 
  82. Id. at 75. 
  83. Wu, supra note 5, at 27. 
  84. Id. 
  85. Id. 
  86. Id. 
  87. Id. at 17; see also Jim Chen, The Echoes of Forgotten Footfalls: 
Telecommunications Mergers at the Dawn of the Digital Millennium, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 
1311, 1313 & n.8 (2007). 
  88. 47 U.S.C. § 202 (2012). 
  89. See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 917 F.2d 30, 37–38 (D.C. Cir. 
1990). 
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discrimination was part of a package of reforms through which Congress legally 
sanctioned the Bell Telephone Company’s monopolization of the nation’s 
telephone system in exchange for a commitment to provide universal telephone 
service to all interested customers at reasonable rates.90 
Because “discrimination” carries such a negative connotation, it is 
important to define precisely what the term means in the economic context.91 
Economists define price discrimination as selling two customers the same good at 
different prices, but the price difference is not explained by differences in the 
seller’s cost.92 In competitive industries, price discrimination is a fairly common 
phenomenon despite its sinister undertone. For example, movie theaters offer 
discounted tickets to seniors and children (thus charging other moviegoers a higher 
price for the same good).93 Price discrimination can be lucrative because different 
customers have different reservation prices (the maximum price the customer is 
willing to pay for a good).94 By charging a higher price to customers with higher 
reservation prices, a firm can capture more profit from customers who greatly 
value the product, without sacrificing sales to those who value the product less. 
Two important observations flow from this discussion. First, not all price 
differentiation constitutes price discrimination.95 Differences in price that result 
from a difference in quality of service, or difference in cost, cannot constitute price 
discrimination, because the vendor is not charging different prices for the same 
good. To paraphrase Matthew Edwards, a car dealer engages in price 
discrimination if he sells the same model Honda four-cylinder car to different 
customers at different prices (for example, because one customer haggled more 
                                                                                                                
  90. See, e.g., Daniel A. Lyons, Technology Convergence and Federalism: Who 
Should Decide the Future of Telecommunications Regulation?, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
383, 388 (2010); Livia Solange West, Deregulating Telecommunications: The Conflict 
Between Competition and Universal Service, 9 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 159, 165–66 (1996). 
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  92. See, e.g., Matthew A. Edwards, Price and Prejudice: The Case Against 
Consumer Equality in the Information Age, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 559, 562 (2006). 
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Time for Reconciliation? 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1239–40 (2010). 
  93. Edwards, supra note 92, at 562 & n.14 (citing Mark Klock, 
Unconcscionability and Price Discrimination, 69 TENN. L. REV. 317, 331 (2002); Michael J. 
Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55, 70 (2001)). 
  94. See Edwards, supra note 92, at 563. 
  95. Boliek, supra note 32, at 1678–79. 
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than the other).96 But if the dealer sells that four-cylinder vehicle at a lower price 
than the six-cylinder, fully-loaded model, the price difference merely reflects 
product differentiation: The more expensive car costs more to make and delivers a 
superior quality of service to the consumer.97 
Second, not all price discrimination is bad. Sometimes, price 
discrimination allows firms to increase their output by reaching more consumers.98 
The senior discount gets senior citizens to the theater who would not come at the 
regular price. By recovering a disproportionate share of its costs from early 
hardback book buyers, a publisher can offer the mass market paperback at a lower 
price than otherwise and therefore sell more total copies. Because of this, Herbert 
Hovenkamp notes that “most price discrimination is socially beneficial in that it 
produces higher output and thus yields greater consumer benefits than forced 
nondiscriminatory pricing.”99 Moreover, price discrimination likely poses less of a 
problem in a competitive market, where consumers unsatisfied with a firm’s 
pricing structure are free to take their business elsewhere. At least in these 
markets, differential pricing strategies can be a form of differentiation and 
competition among firms, and the increased profits flowing from price 
discrimination can both entice new entrants and fund market innovations. 
In the telecommunications context, § 202’s prohibition on unreasonable 
discrimination reflects both of these important observations. Section 202 states 
that: 
It shall be unlawful for any common carrier to make any unjust or 
unreasonable discrimination in charges, practices, classifications, 
regulations, facilities, or services for or in connection with like 
communication service, directly or indirectly, by any means or 
device, or to make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or 
advantage to any particular person, class of persons, or locality, or 
to subject any particular person, class of persons, or locality to any 
undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage.100 
Courts and the Commission have historically subjected § 202 claims to a 
three-part inquiry.101 First, the plaintiff must show that the services in question are 
“like” services.102 Second, the plaintiff must show that the customers have been 
treated differently in the provision of the service (typically by being subjected to 
different prices).103 If the plaintiff carries its burden on the first two steps, the 
                                                                                                                
  96. Edwards, supra note 92, at 563–64. 
  97. Id. 
  98. Boliek, supra note 32, at 1678; Edwards, supra note 92, at 586–91. See 
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ambiguous). 
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Cir. 1993); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 917 F.2d 30, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
102. Competitive Telecomms., 998 F.2d at 1061; MCI Telecomms., 917 F.2d at 39. 
103. Competitive Telecomms., 998 F.2d at 1061; MCI Telecomms., 917 F.2d at 39. 
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burden then shifts to the telecommunications provider to show that the price 
disparity is reasonable.104 
B. Apples and Oranges: Defining “Discrimination” 
By its terms, § 202 encompasses a wide range of conduct. As one court 
has explained: 
The prohibition against different charges to different customers for 
like services under like circumstances is flat and unqualified. The 
pertinent section of the statute bristles with ‘any’. It is made 
unlawful for ‘any’ carrier to make ‘any’ unjust discrimination by 
‘any’ means, or to make ‘any’ undue preference to ‘any’ particular 
person, or to subject ‘any’ person to ‘any’ undue 
prejudice. . . . Equal prices for like services is in itself a matter of 
public interest.105 
But even this broad language highlights an important limitation on the 
scope of § 202. The Act does not prohibit all differences in price between 
consumers. Rather, it only prohibits discrimination among “like” services. This 
caveat is an important reminder that not all incidents of price differentiation 
constitute price discrimination. As the D.C. Circuit explained in Competitive 
Telecommunications Ass’n v. FCC, “[b]y its nature, § 202(a) is not concerned with 
the price differentials between qualitatively different services or service packages. 
In other words, as far as ‘unreasonable discrimination’ is concerned, an apple does 
not have to be priced the same as an orange.”106 
Likeness under § 202 turns upon whether the two services are 
“functionally equivalent,” meaning whether the services in question are “different 
in any material functional respect.”107 At this stage, courts do not consider issues 
such as differences in cost or competitive necessity, which carriers can offer at step 
three to show any discrimination is reasonable.108 Rather, the court or agency must 
“look to the nature of the services offered.”109 Though not dispositive, “the 
perspective of the customer faced with differing services is often considered a 
significant factor.”110 “The test presumes that not all differences between services 
                                                                                                                
104. See, e.g., Competitive Telecomms., 998 F.2d at 1061; MCI Telecomms., 917 
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Hoc Telecomms. Users Comm., 680 F.2d at 795). 
108. MCI Telecomms., 917 F.2d at 39. 
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make them a priori unlike. Rather, the differences must be . . . of practical 
significance to customers.”111 
Several cases help shed light on how the “functional equivalence” test is 
applied. For example, in MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, several small 
telecommunications carriers challenged AT&T’s policy of charging customers a 
discounted rate for bundling several telecommunications services together, rather 
than purchasing each service individually.112 AT&T initially argued that the 
bundled package was different, in part because the larger volumes of bundled 
package consumers generated lower costs for the carrier and thus justified a price 
break.113 The court held that these potential cost differences failed to show the 
bundled offering was not functionally equivalent to the sum of its parts.114 In a 
related case, however, it accepted the argument that customers who purchased the 
bundle surrendered some flexibility as to how AT&T provides the service. 
Although the customers receive the same products in the end, the fact that AT&T 
has more flexibility in determining how to provision those services is sufficient to 
render the bundle not “functionally equivalent” to the sum of its parts if ordered 
individually.115 
Similarly, the Commission permitted AT&T to charge a different rate for 
many “private line” services than for basic service over the public switched 
telephone network. At the risk of oversimplification, private line service allows a 
customer to use a portion of AT&T’s network capacity to keep a dedicated 
connection open at all times between two points of the customer’s choosing, which 
minimizes the risk of interruption or delay when communicating between offices. 
For example, Software Defined Network Service (“SDN”), which AT&T 
introduced in 1986, allowed a customer to maintain a private network between 
geographically remote offices, using space on the shared public switched 
telephone network.116 SDN customers could use the private network to call 
between points on the network using a separate numbering system or to place calls 
outside the private network using traditional telephone numbers.117 Opponents 
asserted that the service was essentially identical to traditional long-distance 
telephone service. But the Commission held that SDN was not functionally 
equivalent to traditional long-distance because (1) the SDN system required 
special equipment that limited its availability and required the customer to use 
different software and equipment than traditional telephone service, and (2) 
customers recognized that SDN service provided additional integrated functions 
                                                                                                                
111. Beehive Tel., Inc. v. Bell Operating Co., 12 FCC Rcd. 17,930, 17,963 
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116. See AT&T Commc’ns Tariff FCC Nos. 1, 9, and 10, 5 FCC Rcd. 298, 298 
(1990). 
117. Id. 
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such as e-mail and teleprocessing that traditional customers would have to 
purchase separately and receive over other networks.118 
Finally, the Commission has allowed carriers to negotiate individual deals 
with customers at prices below tariff, as long as the same deal is then made 
available to any other customer interested in receiving the same service at the same 
price. “Although one normally regards contract relationships as highly 
individualized, contract rates can still be accommodated to the principle of 
nondiscrimination by requiring a carrier offering such rates to make them available 
to any customer willing and able to meet the contract’s terms.”119 Although the 
terms might depart from the tariff, if the same terms are then made available to all 
takers, there is no discrimination in price and therefore no violation of § 202. 
C. Defining “Unreasonable” 
Of course, if a plaintiff succeeds in showing that a carrier has charged 
different prices for like services, it does not necessarily follow that the carrier has 
violated § 202.120 Because the statute only prohibits unreasonable discrimination, a 
carrier may prevail by showing that any discrimination is reasonable. To determine 
whether price discrimination is reasonable, the court must compare “‘the charges 
actually assessed under the two pricing schemes’ and the terms of each 
arrangement.”121 “It may declare the disparate charges lawful only if ‘there is a 
neutral, rational basis underlying [the disparity].’”122 
Cost differentials provide an obvious neutral, rational basis for a price 
disparity.123 This rationale relates back to the economic definition of price 
discrimination: If it costs a carrier more to serve one customer than another, then it 
is not price discrimination to charge that customer a higher price.124 
Unsurprisingly, the Commission has repeatedly stated that “costs have played a 
predominant role in determining whether rates are just and reasonable under our 
statutory standards.”125 During the era of telephone rate regulation, the 
                                                                                                                
118. Id. at 301. 
119. Competitive Telecomms. Ass’n, 998 F.2d at 1063–64 (quoting Sea-Land 
Serv., Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 738 F.2d 1311, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). 
120. Orloff v. FCC, 352 F.3d 415, 420 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“§ 202 prohibits only 
unjust and unreasonable discrimination in charges and service. Orloff is therefore not 
entitled to prevail merely by showing that she did not receive all the sales concessions 
Verizon gave to some other customers—that, in other words, Verizon engaged in 
discrimination. Verizon may still show that the difference in treatment was reasonable.”). 
121. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 917 F.2d 30, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting 
MCI Telecomms. Corp., 842 F.2d 1296, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). 
122. Id. (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Reg. Util. Comm’rs v. FCC, 737 F.2d 1095, 1133 
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (alteration in original)). 
123. See, e.g., Ad Hoc Telecomms. Users Comm. v. FCC, 680 F.2d 790, 797 n.15 
(D.C. Cir. 1982); Am. Broad. Cos. v. FCC 663 F.2d 133, 139 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
124. See supra text accompanying notes 91–97. Indeed, under the economic 
definition, it would constitute price discrimination to charge both consumers the same price 
in the face of differing costs of service. See Ford & Spiwak, supra note 92, at 2. 
125. AT&T (Telpak Rates), 61 F.C.C.2d 587, 609 (1976). 
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Commission regularly required telephone companies to justify their tariffed rates 
based primarily upon costs of service; a tariffed rate was considered per se 
reasonable under § 202. And this cost rationale remains present in the deregulatory 
era. For example, in Connecticut Office of Consumer Counsel v. FCC,126 the court 
upheld a surcharge that AT&T imposed on Connecticut residents to recover the 
expense of a gross receipts tax that the state placed upon AT&T. The court agreed 
that the surcharge was discriminatory, in the sense that Connecticut residents paid 
more than other customers for the same long-distance service.127 Nonetheless, it 
affirmed the Commission’s determination that the surcharge was reasonable to 
prevent the bulk of the Connecticut tax from falling on out-of-state residents 
through rate averaging.128 
Courts and the Commission have also endorsed reasonable discrimination 
on the basis of “competitive necessity.”129 Loosely defined, this rationale suggests 
the need for additional pricing flexibility when a carrier faces a competitive threat. 
This doctrine arose during the transition period between monopoly and 
competition, when AT&T struggled to compete against innovative and less 
regulated new rivals. Originally, competitive necessity required a regulated carrier 
to show a likelihood that a customer would defect to a competitor without the 
benefit of price discrimination.130 For example, the Commission permitted AT&T 
to offer volume-based discounts on certain private-line and special-access services 
if the discount “[met] competition and thereby promote[d] reasonable rates for all 
users.”131 
More recently, the D.C. Circuit in Orloff v. FCC132 struggled with the 
challenge of defining reasonable discrimination in an increasingly competitive 
industry. Orloff challenged the policy of Verizon Wireless to grant concessions to 
cell phone customers who “haggled” with representatives when renewing their cell 
phone contracts.133 As a result of this haggling, these customers received service at 
a lower rate than customers who paid the advertised rates—a clear case of price 
discrimination.134 But was this discrimination unreasonable in a competitive 
marketplace such as Cleveland, where Orloff resided? 
Orloff demonstrates how competition and market power are integral to a 
determination of reasonableness. As the court explained, § 202 was originally 
                                                                                                                
126. 915 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990). 
127. Id. at 78–79. 
128. Id. at 79. 
129. See, e.g., Ad Hoc Telecomms. Users Comm. v. FCC, 680 F.2d 790, 797 n.15 
(D.C. Cir. 1982); Am. Broad. Cos. v. FCC, 663 F.2d 133, 139 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
130. Notably, the Commission was reluctant to endorse this defense for carriers 
who faced little competition or who possessed market power in their service areas. See 
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 13 FCC Rcd. 1718, 1719 (1997) (“The Commission has 
never held that this defense applies to dominant LECs.”). 
131. Private Line Rate Structure and Volume Discount Practices, 97 F.C.C.2d 
923, 947 (1984). 
132. 352 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
133. Id. at 417. 
134. Id. at 420. 
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drafted to govern unreasonable discrimination by a rate-regulated monopoly.135 
Regulated carriers filed their prices in tariffs required by Section 203, which were 
reviewed by the Commission for reasonableness. Typically, a carrier violated § 
202 if it posted different tariffed rates for two like services, or if it charged a rate 
that deviated from the tariff, without making that rate available to all comers on a 
common carriage basis.136 Of course, in a competitive marketplace, prices are 
dictated not by a regulator but by the market. Wireless providers, such as Verizon 
Wireless, are not only excused from the tariff requirement, they were forbidden by 
law from filing tariffs even if they wanted to.137 For competition to shape market 
prices the way the Commission once disciplined tariffs, companies need freedom 
to depart from advertised rates in response to competitive pressure.138 In a 
competitive world, price discrimination based on competitive necessity is the rule, 
not the exception, and helps consumers secure the benefits of competition. 
As a result, Orloff held that in competitive markets, carriers have greater 
flexibility to adopt differentiated pricing strategies without running afoul of § 
202.139 In these markets, discrimination would not allow the carrier “the power to 
control its customers’ economic fates,” because dissatisfied customers can simply 
switch carriers.140 The court was careful to note that its holding did not abrogate § 
202 entirely. Even in competitive markets, carriers cannot “refuse to deal with any 
segment of the public whose business is the type usually accepted.”141 “Nor can 
they decline to serve any particular demographic group.”142 Either would constitute 
unreasonable discrimination. The Commission also emphasized that “what is 
reasonable in this market does not necessarily translate to other markets marked by 
less competition.”143 In markets that are “inadequately competitive,” or that exhibit 
another “market failure” that limits consumers’ ability to “use market forces to 
protect themselves,” § 202 will regulate carrier actions more stringently.144 But in 
competitive markets, discounting “allows consumers to get the full benefit of 
competition by playing competitors against each other.”145 If a carrier adopts 
discounting as a marketing strategy, “[c]onsumers . . . can only benefit.”146 
Finally, courts and the Commission have endorsed several other 
uncontroversial rationales to justify discrimination by carriers. For example, 
discrimination is justified if the unequal treatment is required by law.147 
                                                                                                                
135. Id. at 417. 
136. Id. at 419–21. 
137. Id. at 421. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. at 420 (quoting Orloff v. Vodafone Airtouch Licenses LLC, 17 FCC Rcd. 
8987, 8997 (2002)). 
142. Id. 
143. Orloff v. Vodafone, 17 FCC Rcd. at 8998. 
144. Id. at 8997–98. 
145. Orloff v. FCC, 352 F.3d at 421. 
146. Id. 
147. Union Tel. Co. v. Qwest Corp., 495 F.3d 1187, 1196–97 (10th Cir. 2007). 
1052 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 54:1029 
Discrimination is also justifiable if it is technically impossible for the carrier not to 
discriminate.148 
III. APPLYING § 202 STANDARDS TO THE BROADBAND INDUSTRY 
Because the Commission’s net neutrality rules use the same phrase, 
“unreasonable discrimination,” that Congress used in § 202, the statute provides a 
good starting point when defining the proper scope of the new regulation. Of 
course, administrative law would allow the Commission to define the same phrase 
differently for the broadband and telephone industries.149 But one might expect the 
agency to acknowledge the differences and explain why it is has departed from 
past precedent. In other contexts, the Supreme Court has held that when the same 
phrase is used in two parts of a statute, the phrase is presumed to carry the same 
meaning in both places.150 More generally, the Administrative Procedure Act 
prohibits the Commission from departing from prior precedent without providing a 
“reasoned explanation for its action,” which “would ordinarily demand that it 
display awareness that it is changing position” and explain why it was doing so.151 
It may not “depart from a prior policy sub silentio.”152 
Moreover, the similarities between the telephone and broadband 
industries suggest that § 202 provides a useful framework to determine how a 
nondiscrimination obligation should apply to broadband industries. The telephone 
industry was broadband’s predecessor as the nation’s premiere 
telecommunications network and exhibits many of the same characteristics that net 
neutrality proponents cite to justify a broadband nondiscrimination obligation. 
Both are marked by network effects, meaning that each new user added to the 
network increases the value of the network to every other user. And each serves as 
a platform for putting users in communication with one another, thus serving as a 
catalyst for innovation in adjacent markets. 
Yet while the net neutrality rules borrow from both the language and the 
spirit of § 202, they sacrifice much of the nuance of the older rule and eschew the 
careful policy considerations contained in the caselaw interpreting the statute. 
While the new net neutrality rules remain largely undefined, the Commission has 
left no doubt that it intends its broadband nondiscrimination obligations to sweep 
                                                                                                                
148. Panatronic USA v. AT&T Corp., 287 F.3d 840, 844–45 (9th Cir. 2002). 
149. See, e.g., Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 575–77 (2007). 
150. Id.; see also Atl. Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 
(1932). Of course, in those cases Congress wrote the words in both parts of the statute, 
which is one reason why consistency is presumed. Here, Congress wrote § 202 while the 
Commission wrote the net neutrality rule. But that distinction matters little given that, under 
the Chevron doctrine, the Commission is charged with defining vague statutory terms like 
“unreasonable discrimination.” See, e.g., Universal Serv. Fund Tel. Billing Practices Litig., 
300 F. Supp.2d 1107, 1120 (D.Kan. 2003) (holding that Chevron deference is accorded to 
Commission interpretation of “unreasonable discrimination” under § 202). Therefore the 
Commission is charged with defining the term in both contexts. 
151. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514–15 (2009); see also 
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n vs. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
152. Fox Television, 556 U.S. at 515. 
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more broadly than § 202. This section explores that observation by examining the 
most common allegedly discriminatory concerns leveled against broadband 
providers and examines how a nondiscrimination rule anchored in § 202 would 
address these concerns.153 
A. Blocking 
Blocking remains a primary concern of the Commission and of net 
neutrality proponents. Commentators fear that broadband providers will simply 
close their networks to certain content and application providers, thus preventing 
those companies from using the broadband network to reach consumers. If wielded 
inappropriately, broadband providers could use blocking to disadvantage certain 
competitors in the upstream markets for various Internet services. Net neutrality 
proponents repeatedly cite the Commission’s 2006 investigation into allegations of 
anticompetitive blocking by Madison River Communications to support the need 
for robust net neutrality regulations.154 
As discussed above, the Commission has responded with a strong and 
comprehensive anti-blocking rule. Fixed broadband providers may not “block 
lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices, subject to 
reasonable network management.”155 The Commission explained that “content, 
application, [and] services” should be read broadly to include any lawful Internet 
traffic.156 The no-blocking rule also prohibits broadband providers from charging 
an access fee to content and application providers: “To the extent that a content, 
application, or service provider could avoid being blocked only by paying a fee, 
charging such a fee would not be permissible under these rules.”157 Finally, the 
rule extends to device markets as well: Fixed broadband providers may not limit 
the types of equipment that its consumers use to reach the network unless the 
equipment is harmful to the network.158 Mobile broadband providers are subject to 
a less stringent rule that only prohibits blocking of “lawful websites” or 
                                                                                                                
153. This Article will not address the Commission’s transparency rules, which are 
an important part of its reforms but lie beyond the scope of this discussion. Transparency is 
not a nondiscrimination obligation; rather, it is a requirement that whatever discriminatory 
practices the company adopts, it fully and fairly discloses these practices to its consumers. 
See Net Neutrality Rules, supra note 1, at 17,936. This requirement is uncontroversial. Even 
the most staunch deregulation proponents recognize the government’s role in protecting 
access to accurate information. Transparency is an integral component of maintaining 
broadband competition: For consumers to choose among various broadband providers’ 
offerings, they must be able to judge accurately what each provider is offering and how 
different services compare using metrics other than price alone. 
154. See supra note 29 (discussing allegations that Madison River 
Communications blocked VoIP services over its broadband network because VoIP 
competed with company’s traditional telephone service). 
155. Net Neutrality Rules, supra note 1, at 17,942. 
156. Id. at 17,942. 
157. Id. at 17,943–44. 
158. Id. at 17,943. 
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“applications that compete with the provider’s voice or video telephony 
services.”159 
The broadband industry generally found these rules uncontroversial, 
because providers typically have little incentive to block content or applications. 
As noted above, the value consumers place on broadband access depends largely 
upon how many services consumers can secure online, meaning that blocking 
content or applications undermines the broadband provider’s reputation and 
rates.160 In their comments, several broadband providers indicated that their 
operations comported with the rule and that they are committed to continuing to do 
so.161 Others, such as the Federal Trade Commission, agree that consumer pressure 
will generally deter broadband providers from blocking: “[A]s long as consumers 
have one or more alternatives to which they can turn, it is difficult to imagine them 
accepting the blockage or elimination of content that is important to them.”162 
Like the net neutrality rules, a § 202–based nondiscrimination rule would 
also prohibit most blocking of Internet content, though much would depend on the 
reason for the blocking. A content or application provider subjected to blocking 
typically would have little difficulty showing discrimination: By allowing some 
websites to reach consumers but not others, the broadband provider would be 
denying “like service” to the blocked site. The burden would therefore shift to the 
broadband provider to demonstrate a “neutral, rational basis underlying the 
disparity.”163 In the prototypical case of content-based blocking, where the 
broadband provider blocks content that is critical of the company or that promotes 
causes with which the company disagrees, a court is likely to find that the 
provider’s actions constitute a “refus[al] to deal with any segment of the public 
whose business is the type normally accepted.”164 Orloff explained that this type of 
discrimination would be unreasonable even under the lax standards of a 
competitive marketplace.165 
Thomas Nachbar’s comprehensive analysis of common carriage law 
reaches a similar conclusion.166 Nachbar notes that, historically, regulators have 
been much more willing to impose user-based discrimination than use-based 
discrimination. Although one is often a proxy for another (because a network 
operator may choose to block a particular content provider because its proposed 
use competes with the operator’s other revenue streams, for example), a user-based 
standard is much easier to administer because it does not require the regulator to 
                                                                                                                
159. Id. at 17,959. 
160. See supra text accompanying notes 29–30. 
161. Net Neutrality Rules, supra note 1, at 17,942 & n.197. 
162. FTC, STAFF REPORT, BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION POLICY 157 
(2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/broadband/v070000report.pdf, quoted in 
Gary S. Becker et al., Net Neutrality and Consumer Welfare, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 
497, 502 (2010). 
163. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 917 F.2d 30, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see supra 
text accompanying note 122. 
164. Orloff v. FCC, 352 F.3d 415, 420 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
165. Id. 
166. See Nachbar, supra note 80, at 127–28. 
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involve itself with issues of product design to distinguish good from bad uses. The 
regulator may impose a user-based standard simply by requiring “that a network 
operator provide any service to others that it provides to itself or its affiliates on 
the same terms.”167 In its simplest form, the no-blocking rule is a typical user-
based discrimination standard: Broadband providers may not block one user from 
receiving a service that it provides to itself or other users. 
But unlike the net neutrality rules, § 202 would in some circumstances 
permit a broadband provider to block content or application providers who fail to 
pay a generally applicable access charge to use the broadband network. This is a 
highly speculative scenario, as no broadband provider currently charges such a fee, 
none have plans to do so, and any such charge would likely spawn a backlash from 
customers unable to reach favored Internet content.168 But if a company adopted a 
generally applicable charge to reach consumers on a basic level, § 202 would 
permit the company to block those content and application providers who refused 
to pay the charge. The blocking would not constitute discrimination, because the 
broadband provider is treating the blocked company just like other content 
providers—all would be subject to the same nondiscriminatory payment in 
exchange for access. It is also possible that a broadband provider might place an 
access charge only on unusually bandwidth-intensive applications. Although this 
would be a closer case, it is likely that such charges would also be permissible if 
the broadband provider could show the charges were based on the additional costs 
the application imposed on the network. In this case, the content provider would 
have no problem establishing discrimination. Certain providers are singled out to 
pay for a service that others received for free. But because the discrimination is 
based on the cost differential to serve surcharged companies, the discrimination 
would likely be reasonable.169 Affected content providers may point out that the 
broadband provider is not assessing a smaller cost-based access charge on less-
bandwidth-intensive network traffic. But this is unlikely to carry the day, as prices 
do not need to reflect cost differentials perfectly to be reasonable. 
§ 202 would also likely prohibit blocking lawful network devices, at least 
when the broadband provider has market power. Long ago, the landmark decisions 
in Hush-a-Phone and Carterfone condemned AT&T’s practice of permitting 
customers to use only equipment supplied or approved by the telephone 
company.170 The Commission expressly found that this requirement, which was a 
routine feature of AT&T’s tariffs before their invalidation, was unreasonably 
discriminatory under § 202 because it treated customers with AT&T equipment 
differently than customers with foreign equipment, without justification.171 AT&T 
could only ban devices that it could prove would be harmful to the network or if 
                                                                                                                
167. Id. 
168. See Net Neutrality Rules, supra note 1, 17,942 & n.197. 
169. See supra text accompanying notes 123–28. 
170. See Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C.2d 
420, 423 (1968); Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F. 2d 266, 269 (D.C. Cir. 
1956). 
171. Carterfone, 13 F.C.C.2d at 425–26. 
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they failed to meet reasonable technical standards for interconnection.172 The net 
neutrality device rules mirror Carterfone and therefore have an effect similar to § 
202. 
B. Throttling 
Throttling—the intentional delaying of targeted network traffic—is 
perhaps the most high-profile battleground so far in the net neutrality debate. It 
was, of course, Comcast’s decision to throttle bandwidth-intensive torrent traffic 
that incited the Commission to impose binding net neutrality obligations on the 
industry.173 Comcast claimed that throttling was necessary during peak periods to 
manage network congestion and limit the impact that torrent users had on other 
users sharing neighborhood broadband lines.174 The Commission disagreed, 
although its ruling stemmed at least in part from the deceptive way that the 
company hid its actions from consumers.175 
The net neutrality rules largely disfavor targeted throttling. The 
Commission explicitly bans broadband providers from “impairing or degrading 
particular content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices so as to render 
them effectively unusable,” because this degree of degradation would be 
functionally equivalent to blocking.176 But it declined to “impose a blanket 
prohibition on degradation of traffic more generally,” because it recognized that 
some degradation is the “unavoidable” byproduct of network congestion, which is 
inevitable on even the most advanced networks.177 The rules also prohibit 
broadband providers from degrading traffic to secure an advantage in an adjacent 
market or to limit speech with which the broadband provider disagrees.178 While 
the Commission suggested that some throttling may be permissible in the interests 
of reasonable network management,179 it strongly prefers “[u]se-agnostic 
                                                                                                                
172. Id. at 424. 
173. See supra text accompanying notes 53–57. 
174. Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast 
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discrimination” to alleviate network congestion.180 This language suggests that the 
targeted throttling of particular bandwidth-intensive content or applications would 
not constitute reasonable network management and therefore would violate the 
rules. 
By comparison, § 202 would probably permit at least some targeted 
throttling to alleviate network congestion. If a broadband provider were to throttle 
BitTorrent traffic, for example, torrent users would easily be able to show 
discrimination. By slowing down only torrent-related traffic, the provider would be 
treating torrent users differently than other consumers with the provision of like 
service. The burden would then shift to the broadband provider to demonstrate a 
“neutral, rational basis” for the disparity.181 In Comcast’s case, the company 
argued that throttling torrent traffic was necessary to alleviate the disproportionate 
effect that torrent users had on network congestion.182 Because torrent users 
typically engage in significant amounts of file-sharing among end users, they 
generally consume more bandwidth than traditional broadband customers: A 
“disproportionately large amount of the traffic currently on broadband networks 
originates from a relatively small number of users.”183 When this traffic exceeds 
the capacity of a broadband network to deliver that traffic at normal speeds 
through a particular network bottleneck, all customers who depend on that 
bottleneck (torrent users and non-torrent users alike) will experience congestion. 
There is room under § 202 for a court to find it is “neutral” and “rational” for the 
broadband provider to throttle traffic related to those applications having a 
disproportionate effect on congestion, because such throttling would shield 
traditional users from degradation and delay caused by torrent applications. 
But even under § 202, there are only limited conditions under which 
throttling might be permissible. First, the broadband provider should only throttle 
traffic during periods of actual network congestion—absent congestion, there is no 
reason to throttle bandwidth-intensive applications because they cause no harm to 
other users. The Commission rejected Comcast’s defense in part because the 
evidence showed the company did not “carefully tailor” its operations, instead 
throttling traffic during non-congested periods and in non-congested 
neighborhoods.184 Second, whether throttling is an appropriate response to 
congestion turns in part upon the network architecture, which varies among 
broadband providers. Torrent traffic hurt Comcast users in part because Comcast is 
a “shared network.”185 Users in a neighborhood share one high-capacity broadband 
line, meaning that one or two torrent users can claim a disproportionate share of 
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the bandwidth available in the common pool.186 On non-shared networks, such as 
Verizon’s FiOS broadband service, which maintain dedicated high-speed lines to 
each individual user, the common pool problem is minimized and therefore 
throttling would be less justifiable. Finally, the Commission should not hesitate to 
demand evidence of a broadband provider’s actual throttling practices and to 
balance the utility of alleviating network congestion against the potential 
downsides of throttling—for example, leveraging broadband market power to gain 
an unfair advantage in an upstream market for Internet content or applications. 
C. Tiering and Quality of Service Guarantees 
Tiering is the most glaring point of distinction between the net neutrality 
rules and a § 202 approach. “Tiering” refers to the ability of broadband providers 
to charge content and application providers a fee in exchange for a higher quality 
of service when those providers use the network to reach consumers.187 As noted 
above,188 most broadband networks are “best efforts” networks, meaning that the 
network routes all packets similarly based upon its best guess as to how to get the 
packet to its final destination, but without any guarantee regarding whether the 
packet will actually get there or how quickly.189 A tiered model would allow 
content and application providers to pay a premium to the broadband provider in 
exchange for guaranteed delivery at or above a certain speed. The broadband 
provider would fulfill this guarantee largely by giving premium packets priority in 
event of network congestion, thus minimizing the risk that congestion will cause 
packet delay or packet loss for premium-tier transmissions. 
The Commission has indicated that tiered service likely constitutes 
unreasonable discrimination under the net neutrality rules.190 Pay-for-priority 
agreements would “raise significant cause for concern” because they would 
represent a departure from existing norms and could harm competition and 
innovation in adjacent markets for Internet content and applications.191 A tiered 
service model would allow certain content and application providers to secure a 
quality of service advantage over rivals on the basis of ability and willingness to 
pay, which could disadvantage start-up companies and noncommercial 
enterprises.192 Finally, a broadband provider that offers premium service for a fee 
would have incentives to reduce the quality of its “best efforts” delivery to induce 
content and application providers to instead pay for a quality of service 
guarantee.193 
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By comparison, § 202 would permit a broadband provider to offer a 
tiered-service model, as long as premium tier service was generally available to all 
interested content and application providers at similar rates. If, for example, 
Netflix were to pay Verizon a fee to guarantee delivery of streaming video content 
at a minimum speed, rivals such as Hulu could not assert a claim under § 202 for 
unreasonable discrimination. This is because “best efforts” delivery and premium 
delivery are not “like services.” A “best efforts” customer receives no assurance 
regarding when, if ever, its packets will be delivered and has no protection against 
congestion-related delays. But the premium customer would know that its content 
would be largely unaffected by congestion and would receive a guarantee that its 
packets would reach their destinations within a particular time frame, presumably 
secured by some penalty in the event Verizon failed to fulfill its promise. Like 
traditional telephone service and private line service, “best efforts” delivery and 
guaranteed delivery are not “functionally equivalent” because they differ in ways 
that have practical significance to the customer. These different value propositions 
justify a difference in price and insulate the broadband provider from a claim of 
unreasonable discrimination. Under § 202, the carrier is permitted to enter into a 
special priority access agreement with a customer, as long as it makes the same 
terms available to all other customers willing to pay the premium.194 
Again, Nachbar’s distinction between user-based and use-based 
discrimination is useful. The ban on tiered service is a use-based discrimination 
rule. It prohibits the network operator from offering prioritization or guaranteed 
delivery to those content and application providers whose proposed uses would 
benefit from higher-level service. As Nachbar explains, use-based discrimination 
rules inevitably require the regulator to involve itself in design standards—as the 
Commission has by endorsing the best efforts network over other forms of content 
delivery.195 Regulators have been reluctant to assume this duty, and for good 
reason. Through regulatory error or, more nefariously, regulatory capture, this 
interference can retard innovation in content and application markets. Regulatory 
processes are biased toward incumbent technologies, because regulators and 
commenters find it easier to discuss existing technologies than hypothetical future 
ones.196 And the larger the government’s role in design standards, the greater the 
incentive is for affected companies to capture the regulatory process and subvert it 
toward their private ends.197 
Net neutrality proponents fear that because broadband networks create 
positive externalities, network owners may use tiered service in a “sad effort[] to 
capture some of the value of what their infrastructure inspires” in ways that harm 
the overall health of the network.198 In other words, charges for priority delivery 
might represent nothing more than broadband providers’ attempts to share in the 
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profits of downstream content and application providers, in the process driving up 
the cost of doing business on the Internet and squeezing out companies that 
otherwise would flourish. Without question, broadband networks generate 
spillover effects that benefit society above and beyond the profit they bring the 
network owner.199 But as Gregory Sidak and David Teece note, “[s]pillovers are 
common in competitive markets, and their mere existence does not establish the 
existence of market failure that warrants regulatory intervention.”200 In fact, they 
continue, these spillovers may drive greater innovation, not less: “Industries with 
significant spillovers generally experience more and faster innovation than 
industries with fewer spillovers.”201 
In the broadband context, the spillover argument ignores the fact that 
existing best efforts networks also impose negative externalities on certain content 
providers, namely congestion.202 Far from reducing the overall value of the 
network, tiered service may enhance its value by making it more feasible for 
Internet content that is susceptible to congestion to be delivered efficiently to 
consumers. Moreover, it ignores the fact that many content and application 
providers already pay for quality-of-service improvements elsewhere in the 
Internet ecosystem. Content Delivery Networks (“CDNs”), such as Akamai 
Technologies and Level 3 Communications, act as middleman alternatives to the 
public Internet, storing a content provider’s information in multiple, dispersed 
locations and carrying that information for a fee over their own private networks to 
a point very close to the end-user consumer. Although the last leg of this journey, 
from the CDN to the consumer, is carried on the best efforts Internet, most of the 
journey takes place over the CDN’s private network, which increases the quality of 
the service. For companies like Netflix, whose product is susceptible to 
congestion, CDNs are an essential partner. Far from inhibiting innovation in 
content markets, these CDNs make services like Netflix possible. And because 
CDNs are not covered by the net neutrality rules, the net effect of the rule is to 
prevent broadband providers from competing against CDNs, hurting in particular 
smaller-scale content providers that need priority transport but lack the scale to 
afford CDN rates.203 
Tiered service allows for the network operator to alleviate congestion 
through intelligent traffic management. The U.S. Postal Service, for example, 
offers first-class mail and a higher-priced priority delivery option as one way to 
separate time-sensitive packages from those less sensitive to delay.204 Priority mail 
customers have paid a premium to insulate their packages from delay. The 
customer is unlikely to pay the premium unless delay was somehow detrimental to 
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the customer. Thus, the premium signals to the post office that this customer’s 
package should claim some of the limited space on the next available freight flight, 
while the less time-sensitive first-class package can afford to wait for a later flight 
or ground delivery. 
In the same fashion, tiered delivery allows broadband providers to 
determine which packets should receive priority delivery in the event of network 
congestion. Assume, for example, that packets from the following four streams 
reach a network bottleneck simultaneously and must be queued: an e-mail being 
retrieved from a storage server, a webpage, part of a movie streaming to a Netflix 
customer, and part of a telemedicine application wherein a New York surgeon is 
guiding a rural Missouri doctor through a procedure in real-time. The broadband 
provider must decide in which order these packets get through; the only question is 
what rule the provider will use. 
The broadband provider could simply choose randomly among the four 
packets, but this solution is suboptimal because the four applications have varying 
sensitivities to delay. A fraction of a second may be an imperceptible delay to the 
e-mail and webpage recipients, but can cause the video stream and the 
telemedicine application to skip, resulting in a lower-quality experience for the 
Netflix customer and even greater risks to the Missouri surgeon and his patient. 
The net neutrality rules endorse a use-agnostic rule whereby the broadband 
provider would prioritize packets sent to those users who have used the network 
the least during some preceding period of time.205 But this rule could have the 
perverse effect of assuring that the Netflix and telemedicine applications are 
delayed, if (as is likely) the Netflix customer and the Missouri hospital are heavier-
bandwidth consumers than the e-mail and webpage recipients. Alternatively, if the 
Commission had permitted it, the broadband provider could develop its own 
taxonomy to prioritize all possible Internet content and applications on the basis of 
sensitivity to delay. But this approach would be expensive and likely incomplete, 
given the millions of services available online. And it would give enormous power 
to broadband providers to shape the flow of information in cyberspace. It would 
also require broadband providers to engage in deep packet inspection to classify 
each packet on the system, which is undesirable for privacy reasons (just as we do 
not want the postal service to read our mail to decide how best to route it). 
Alternatively, the broadband provider could rely on the pricing 
mechanism to determine how to allocate its bandwidth, just as our economy uses 
prices to allocate most other scarce resources in society. If priority delivery was 
available for a fee, the broadband provider would not need to rely on its own 
judgment to determine which applications are most sensitive to delay. It could rely 
instead on the application providers’ own judgments. Netflix and the telemedicine 
application provider would recognize that congestion-related delay could harm the 
quality of their product. Therefore, to protect their value proposition to their 
consumers, they may elect to pay for priority delivery and minimize the risk of 
such delays. By comparison, the e-mail and web page servers would recognize 
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their products are not sensitive to delay and therefore would not pay the premium. 
Therefore, the price mechanism allows the broadband provider to utilize the local 
knowledge each application provider has regarding its sensitivity to delay, and to 
route packets in an efficient fashion.206 Tiered service has not yet developed in the 
broadband market, partly because congestion is the exception rather than the rule 
and CDNs are currently filling that market need. But our appetite for more and 
better Internet applications is ever-growing. If growth in the demand for online 
goods and services exceeds growth in the quantity and speed by which technology 
enables those services to be delivered to consumers, congestion could become a 
larger problem. As Atkinson and Weiser noted, best-effort networks may inhibit 
the deployment of next-generation applications that require high speed and low 
latency to meet consumer expectations.207 The availability of quality-of-service 
guarantees could help boost innovation in the content and application market by 
allowing developers more freedom to create new applications that a best efforts 
architecture could not support. A § 202–based approach would permit this 
innovation in the broadband market and promote additional innovation in upstream 
products. 
D. Individual Contracts and Exclusivity Agreements 
A thornier question is presented by individual contracts or exclusivity 
agreements, wherein the broadband provider provides priority delivery to one 
content or application provider but not to its competitors. For example, after 
contracting to provide priority delivery to Netflix, Comcast may decide not to 
extend a similar offer to Hulu. This could be either because it simply chooses not 
to do so or because Netflix has bargained for a clause in its service agreement 
precluding Comcast from offering similar terms to its competitors. Such 
agreements are almost certainly impermissible under the net neutrality rules. 
Because such agreements would distort competition in the market for Internet 
content or applications, the Commission is likely to find them to be unreasonably 
discriminatory against the disadvantaged entities. 
The treatment of such an agreement under § 202 is more complicated. 
The failure to offer tiering on similar terms to similarly situated customers would 
constitute discrimination under § 202. In the above example, Hulu is denied the 
opportunity to purchase priority access on the terms offered to Netflix (or indeed, 
on any terms) and thus is being subjected to different treatment in the provision of 
like service. Moreover, in many cases this agreement would be unreasonable as 
well. Under the rule announced in Sea-Land Service,208 a common carrier could 
depart from its tariff and negotiate a special customer-specific rate only if it then 
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filed the contract as a tariff and made the same terms to similarly-situated 
customers.209 
But as Orloff noted, the Sea-Land Service rule, and the tariff regime that 
it served, were designed to prevent so-called “dominant” carriers from using 
discrimination to “control [their] customers’ economic fates.”210 By comparison, 
the Commission has repeatedly stated that “carriers lacking market power are 
presumptively unable to engage in unreasonable discrimination.”211 Therefore in 
an area where Comcast lacks market power, this exclusivity agreement more 
closely resembles a concession resulting from marketplace negotiations with 
Netflix, which is reasonable under Orloff. The arrangement would not threaten 
competition because Hulu is free to strike a similar agreement with another 
broadband provider. And Comcast customers who seek high-quality service from 
Hulu or other Netflix competitors could punish Comcast by switching broadband 
providers. 
By prohibiting exclusivity agreements in competitive markets, the 
Commission has failed to appreciate the value of alliances between providers in 
related markets and the innovation it can bring to the network provider’s 
marketplace. One need look no further than the 2007 AT&T-iPhone agreement to 
see how transformative these agreements can be.212 The agreement, under which 
Apple agreed to make its new iPhone available exclusively to AT&T subscribers 
for three years, helped boost AT&T in a highly competitive wireless marketplace 
by giving the company a technological edge over its rivals. Shortly thereafter, 
Verizon partnered with Motorola to offer the Droid phone, jumpstarting a sleepy 
smartphone market and leading to fierce competition in the wireless device market. 
At the same time, the evolution of smartphones drove changes in wireless carriers 
as well. Voice-based service plans with small text and data bundles gave way to 
data-centric service plans, through which consumers are finally beginning to 
experience the oft-promised wireless broadband alternative to traditional telephone 
and cable-based broadband service. 
The same rule should govern a broadband provider’s attempts to prioritize 
its own traffic over those of third parties with which it competes. If the broadband 
provider has market power in the broadband market, then prioritization of its own 
traffic or that of a favored partner effectively wields that market power to gain an 
undue advantage in an adjacent market. In this circumstance, the Commission 
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should prohibit such prioritization if the result is anticompetitive or harmful to 
consumers. But absent market power, the broadband provider should be free to 
explore the benefits of synergy between broadband transport and adjacent markets 
for related services. This synergy could benefit consumers by providing a more 
integrated service than is available elsewhere, and consumers disappointed by the 
offering can avoid potential problems by simply switching broadband providers. 
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NONDISCRIMINATION AND 
COMPETITION 
The differences between the net neutrality rules and a § 202-based 
approach highlight an issue that the Commission only briefly addresses: the 
relationship between nondiscrimination and competition. In the telephone context, 
the Commission has struggled for decades to define the effect that increased 
competition should have on a carrier’s nondiscrimination obligations. Yet the net 
neutrality rules only briefly and indirectly address this accumulated wisdom. The 
Commission’s failure to apply this historical lesson represents a missed 
opportunity and goes far to explain why the net neutrality rules reach further than § 
202 and shows the dangers inherent in that overreach. 
In the context of economic regulation, nondiscrimination law is at its peak 
when regulating companies that abuse market power in ways that harm 
consumers.213 § 202, for example, was adopted to control the Bell system, which 
had a monopoly over most of the nation’s telephone service from the 1920s until 
its breakup in 1984. During this period, regulators tolerated Bell’s dominant 
position because they considered telephone service a natural monopoly that was 
best provided by one company. But Congress also imposed nondiscrimination 
obligations, along with rate regulation and tariffing obligations, to prevent Bell 
from abusing its monopoly power in ways that would harm consumers.214 
As portions of the telecommunications industry became more 
competitive, the Commission realized that strict adherence to tariffs and 
undifferentiated pricing inhibited innovation and competition. New carriers 
seeking to make inroads against Bell needed to be nimble, flexible, and able to 
serve niche markets whose needs were not met by the market leader. For such 
carriers, tariffing was an expensive and time-consuming proposition that inhibited 
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their ability to respond quickly to market opportunities, while adherence to a strict 
nondiscrimination requirement prevented them from meeting the unique needs of 
niche markets. 
Ultimately, the Commission concluded, “based upon the well-established 
teachings of modern welfare economics that a firm without market power does not 
have the ability or incentive to price its services unreasonably [or] to discriminate 
among customers unjustly.”215 In the wireline context, the Commission fought for 
almost two decades to detariff nondominant carriers, so they had more flexibility 
to challenge AT&T, the market leader.216 As the wireless market emerged with no 
player clearly wielding market power, the Commission opted for a detariffed 
environment in which competition would dictate pricing and service options. A 
wireless carrier’s success, the Commission explained, “should be driven by 
technological innovation, service quality, competition-based pricing decisions, and 
responsiveness to consumer needs—and not by strategies in the regulatory 
arena.”217 Both initiatives recognized that some discriminatory pricing can be 
beneficial by expanding the firm’s total output, meeting the needs of niche 
consumers, and putting competitive pressure on other carriers.218 Any harmful 
discrimination will be punished through customer defection. For nondominant 
carriers, the market plays a significant role in policing unreasonable 
discrimination, and the regulator steps in only infrequently to enforce basic norms 
of fairness. 
Given these lessons from history, the FCC should tread lightly when 
imposing net neutrality obligations on broadband providers. The Commission has 
repeatedly found that the market for broadband service is competitive, with 82% of 
Americans having a choice of at least two providers for broadband service, usually 
the telephone company and the cable company.219 And that competitiveness will 
increase as wireless broadband service matures as a viable third alternative. 
Moreover, there have been few instances of Commission actions to punish 
broadband providers for discriminatory behavior.220 By recognizing the role of 
competition to discipline market behavior, the Commission can better tailor its net 
neutrality rules to focus on the real danger posed by discrimination—the abuse of 
market power in a way that hurts consumers. 
The Commission has tacitly recognized this point when justifying its 
differential treatment of the mobile broadband industry. While recognizing that 
“[t]here is one Internet” and that “[c]onsumer choice, freedom of expression, end-
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user control, competition, and the freedom to innovate without permission are as 
important when end users are accessing the Internet via mobile broadband as via 
fixed,”221 the Commission nonetheless adopted a much less stringent net neutrality 
rule for mobile broadband. Specifically, mobile broadband providers are only 
forbidden from blocking (1) lawful websites and (2) applications that compete 
against the provider’s voice or video telephone services,222 and more importantly, 
they are not subject to the Commission’s prohibition on unreasonable 
discrimination.223 The Commission explained that mobile broadband is “rapidly 
evolving” and that a stringent nondiscrimination rule might inhibit the “evolution 
of new business models.”224 Moreover, the mobile broadband market is highly 
competitive, which helps mitigate the risk of harmful discrimination.225 Finally, 
mobile broadband networks face greater capacity challenges than their wireline 
counterparts, which may require providers to exercise more flexibility and 
intelligent traffic management than the rules generally permit.226 
The Commission’s narrower mobile broadband rules more closely 
resemble a § 202–based nondiscrimination rule. The Commission should recognize 
that the same factors should govern fixed broadband as well. There are many 
benefits of a more nuanced rule that sanctions only discrimination in the provision 
of “functionally equivalent” services and grants more flexibility to firms that lack 
market power. As noted above, this rule would allow broadband providers to use 
the pricing mechanism to engage in intelligent traffic management, resolving 
congestion by routing packets according to their sensitivity to delay, as exhibited 
by their providers’ willingness to pay for priority delivery.227 It would also allow 
providers to engage in discrimination that does not pose a threat to consumers or 
competition. 
In response, one might argue that market pressure is often insufficient to 
punish bad behavior, even by actors that lack market power. This critique is 
implicit in the Commission’s net neutrality order, and has been made more 
explicitly by many net neutrality proponents. For example, Rob Frieden notes that 
consumers may incur substantial switching costs, which limits their ability to 
change broadband providers at will.228 These switching costs include the time 
spent researching competitors, negotiating with customer service representatives, 
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and waiting for an installation technician.229 But the primary switching cost is the 
long-term service contract, which ties a consumer to a provider for a year or more, 
with a substantial penalty for early termination. Of course, the greater the 
switching cost, the more discrimination a customer is willing to tolerate before 
taking the bold step of changing providers. But in the last few years, each major 
nationwide broadband provider has introduced a no-term contract option for 
consumers.230 For customers choosing this option, switching costs have fallen 
dramatically, which increases the competitiveness of the broadband industry in 
most areas. 
Frieden and others also note that competition is hampered by the fact that 
in most areas customers have few options to choose from. The power to switch 
providers loses some force if there are few other options to choose from. While the 
Commission has noted that 82% of American census tracts have two or more 
competitive options for broadband wireline service, 78% have only two options 
(typically the telephone company and the cable company).231 Moreover, the 
Commission notes that it lacks granulated data on price and performance to 
determine if two providers compete head-to-head throughout the area.232 Susan 
Crawford notes that most cable broadband providers recently upgraded their 
networks to DOCSIS 3.0, which is capable of much higher speeds than fiber-to-
the-node or DSL technology that most telephone companies use.233 Except in 
places where Verizon offers its FiOS all-fiber-optic broadband service, cable-
based broadband far outpaces telephone-based broadband, and therefore 
competition between the two is skewed. Startup costs remain a significant barrier 
to entry in the fixed broadband market. And while wireless broadband use is 
growing substantially, even 4G networks are not yet capable of being perfect 
substitutes for fixed broadband service.234 
One may ask whether the net neutrality rules may in fact exacerbate this 
problem. The Commission repeatedly justified its net neutrality rules by appealing 
to the need to maximize innovation in markets for Internet content and 
applications. But as Christopher Yoo has noted, this comes at the cost of 
innovation in the broadband market, because fixed providers are prohibited from 
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experimenting with new models for delivery of Internet traffic.235 This prevents 
entrepreneurs from entering the broadband market with new and innovative 
business models that might help lower entry costs. One sees this type of innovation 
in the 2005 deal struck between Clearwire and Bell Canada.236 Clearwire sought to 
create a nationwide network of next-generation mobile broadband service 
throughout the United States and elsewhere. To expand quickly, Clearwire 
arranged to receive a $100 million capital infusion from Bell Canada, Canada’s 
dominant telephone provider. In exchange, Bell Canada received a significant 
equity stake in the company, and Clearwire agreed to use Bell Canada as its 
exclusive provider for VoIP and certain other Internet Protocol-enabled services in 
the United States for a limited period.237 In essence, Clearwire’s non-neutral 
business model unlocked the funding it needed to enter the market and compete 
against incumbent wireless providers.238 Although Clearwire’s model has since 
evolved and Bell Canada no longer receives preferential treatment over its 
network,239 the anecdote illustrates the role that non-neutral business models can 
play to promote innovation and competition in the broadband market. 
Of course, these alternatives have yet to rise in significant numbers, 
meaning that at least until wireless technology matures, most Americans have only 
two choices for broadband service. The question then becomes whether the 
telephone and cable companies are more likely to compete or coordinate with one 
another. Alfred Kahn, the late dean of regulated utilities law, has explained that 
“[t]here is no consensus among economists about the likely sufficiency of 
competition under duopoly.”240 In the broadband industry, one can see evidence of 
vigorous competition for customers. The biggest players spend large sums each 
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year advertising their broadband services, often directly comparing their services 
to that of their rivals. As noted above, when AT&T introduced a no-term service 
contract in 2008, touting it as service “without the hassle of a term commitment 
like those of cable companies,” most of the industry followed suit.241 And the cable 
industry was under no regulatory obligation to roll out DOCSIS 3.0, but did so to 
improve broadband speed and gain a competitive advantage over rivals. On the 
other hand, Verizon’s decision to halt FiOS buildouts and Verizon Wireless’s deal 
with SpectrumCo (in which Verizon Wireless and cable operators agreed to cross-
promote one another’s services as part of Verizon Wireless’s $3.6 billion purchase 
of valuable cable-owned spectrum)242 suggest the two can also cooperate when it 
serves their mutual interests to do so. 
This uncertainty suggests it is unwise to adopt a broad ex ante prohibition 
on unreasonable discrimination, because it is unclear whether regulatory 
intervention is helpful or harmful to consumers. The net neutrality rules assume 
without evidence that broadband markets are inherently anticompetitive and that 
regulation is preferable to private control of networks. But competition may be 
sufficient to discipline bad behavior, even in a duopoly structure. And the 
regulatory process is susceptible to capture. “[T]he same economic characteristics 
that allow private actors to dominate markets also allow them to dominate politics 
as well.”243 A better approach would apply the nondiscrimination rule more 
cautiously, sanctioning only those providers with market power, and whose actions 
have actually harmed consumers. Otherwise, as Nachbar notes, overregulation 
risks distorting the content and application markets to an even greater degree than 
underregulation: 
If one network operator engages in use-based discrimination to the 
detriment of a developing technology, the proponents of the 
technology at least have a chance of finding another form of 
carriage. But if a new technology requires a form of carriage that 
has been regulatorily excluded from the design of modern 
communications networks—such as the level-of-service guarantees 
that some potential Internet applications require—it will have zero 
chance of ever developing.244 
As Nachbar’s observation suggests, a more nuanced rule would focus on 
the true harm posed by economic discrimination: the abuse of market power in a 
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way that harms consumers. The core concern animating net neutrality debates is 
the risk of a broadband provider eliminating a consumer’s access to content or 
applications for selfish reasons, leaving the consumer with no recourse to get the 
services that it desires online. A § 202-based approach would still permit the 
regulator to intervene in these situations, if the consumer lacks the ability to 
remedy the problem by switching providers. But unlike the existing regime, it 
would also respect the roles played by competition and antitrust law as backstops 
to help police firm behavior.245 A balanced net neutrality rule would not eschew 
antitrust law, but would embrace it as an assistant in the fight to curb 
anticompetitive behavior and would internalize the lesson that antitrust regulators 
have learned—that not all differentiation is discrimination, and that some 
discrimination is beneficial, or even integral, for a competitive market to 
function.246 
Because vertical contractual agreements have such ambiguous effects on 
consumer welfare, antitrust law adopts a case-by-case rule of reason analysis to 
determine whether a particular agreement should be barred.247 This approach 
already bars much of the conduct that net neutrality advocates most fear—
anticompetitive foreclosure.248 But unlike the Commission’s per se rule, it leaves 
room for procompetitive vertical agreements, which would increase the overall 
value of the network.249 Critics correctly note that antitrust enforcement is often 
costly, time-consuming, and unpredictable.250 But it has also been responsible for 
some of the telecommunications industry’s greatest successes, including the 
Kingsbury Agreement and the 1984 Consent Decree that broke up the Bell 
monopoly and accelerated the race toward a competitive telecommunications 
industry. It is noteworthy that both the Federal Trade Commission and the 
Department of Justice, the branches of government responsible for enforcing the 
antitrust laws, have questioned the need for net neutrality rules and explained that 
“antitrust is up to the task of protecting consumers from vertical contracts that 
threaten competition.”251 
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CONCLUSION 
The jurisdictional issue continues to lurk as the elephant in the room of 
the net neutrality debate. As noted above, many broadband providers have sued to 
block the net neutrality rules and that case is pending in the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals. If, as many commentators expect, the court invalidates the rules for 
failure to overcome the jurisdictional issues that were dispositive in Comcast, then 
the Commission will have no choice but to reclassify broadband service under 
Title II to proceed with its net neutrality project. Reclassification would highlight 
the gulf between the net neutrality rules and a § 202 approach, because the agency 
would be relying on § 202 to impose a nondiscrimination obligation on broadband 
providers. 
Of course, as noted above, administrative law permits the agency to 
establish different nondiscrimination rules for the broadband and telephone 
industries. And this remains true regardless of whether the Commission is applying 
§ 202 to broadband or imposing a more amorphous nondiscrimination rule using 
its Title I authority. But the Commission should explain why it is departing from 
past precedent in the application of its per se rule. To date, the Commission has not 
reconciled the breadth of its broadband nondiscrimination rules with the 
accumulated history of nondiscrimination law developed under § 202. 
Moreover, given the increasingly competitive nature of much of the 
broadband industry, any reasoned explanation should concede that § 202 should be 
the ceiling, not the floor, for a broadband nondiscrimination obligation. Telephone 
companies have always been permitted to engage in intelligent traffic management 
because of the recognition that users are not uniform and network capacity is a 
limited resource that must be divided somehow to fill users’ needs efficiently.252 
And in competitive telephone markets, the Commission has long recognized that 
some discrimination can benefit consumers by promoting innovation and 
competition. Broadband providers should be permitted the same flexibility, at least 
in the absence of a showing of market power and consumer harm. Denying 
broadband providers this flexibility, by invoking the traditional language of 
common carriage while redefining the duties that language carries, is both unwise 
policy and an incorrect interpretation of the history of common carriage. 
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